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Industrial adoption of cloud computing for 
collaborative business processes is limited by their ability 
to meet inter-enterprise security requirements. Although 
some clouds offerings comply with security standards, no 
solution today allows businesses to assess security 
compliance of applications at the business level and 
dynamically link to security countermeasures on-demand. 
In this paper, we present a Platform-as-a-Service 
infrastructure that combines semantic security risk 
management tools with dynamic web service policy 
frameworks to support the mitigation of security threats 
throughout the lifecycle of a service-oriented application 
deployed within the cloud. The platform address the need 
to model security requirements, dynamically provision 
and configure security services and link operational 
security events to vulnerabilities and impact assessments 
at the business level. The Platform has been evaluated 
using a collaborative engineering design scenario and a 
proof-of-concept deployed at a multi-tenant cloud as part 
of the UK CFMS project. The work is being further 




Cloud computing is the latest in a long line of attempts 
to support service-based outsourcing and collaborative 
hosting environments for the extended enterprise. 
Building on the principle of commoditized IT assets and 
on-demand usage patterns, clouds are significantly 
reducing the costs of operating software systems. Today, 
industrial adoption of public or collaborative clouds is 
limited by their ability to support governance 
requirements for QoS management and security. Only 
through the commoditization of on-demand governance 
services that adapt to individual business needs will 
clouds be accepted more widely by industry.  
This paper describes a novel service-oriented 
infrastructure (SOI) being developed as part of the UK 
TSB CFMS Core Programme [1] and further developed 
in European Commission ICT SERSCIS project [2]. The 
SOI aims to provide a Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) 
solution for on-demand management of security risks 
associated with digital assets shared in collaborative 
clouds. The SOI brings together data management, 
process management and trust management to allow 
business decision makers to plan service networks, to 
assess explicitly the consequences of security decisions 
and to mitigate emerging threats dynamically. 
The paper reviews security requirements for Clouds 
and support in the marketplace today. The security risk 
management methodology, tools and services are 
described. Explicit consideration is made for the layers of 
governance, policy lifecycle and how risk assessment 
tools have been combined with dynamic web service 
policy management to support inter-enterprise security 
requirements. The results are evaluated in a proof-of-
concept from the engineering sector where assurances for 
the protection of intellectual property rights are mandated 
for disclosed design data. When then describe how in 
SERSCIS the model is being enhanced to support 
collaborative decision making [3] through vulnerability 





Maintaining the value of digital assets is critical for 
Enterprises participating in the knowledge economy. 
With the increasing use of the Internet to facilitate 
communication and collaboration between organizations, 
it is all too easy to lose ownership and control of 
knowledge as it is represented as digital information. 
Once disclosed the economic properties of digital 
information (non-rivalrous and diffusive) means that 
disclosure can have severe consequences for 
competitiveness, revenues and reputation [4]. 
Consequently, enterprises with a very low tolerance to 
risk will tend either not share information, often to the 
detriment of potential business exploitation, or maintain 
complicated and costly intellectual property arrangements 
with out-of-band information distribution channels [5].  
For adoption of clouds by industry, tools and services 
are needed to analyze security requirements and status in 
the context of the following security questions: 
a) Does this system satisfy my security requirements 
given its current state and security configuration? 
b) Can the system evolve in ways that may compromise 
any of these requirements, and what policies could I use 
to prevent this? c) How can I recognize if and when such changes do 
occur, and how can I manage the resulting threats? 
To answer such questions the Cloud must be examined 
at both business and technical levels. Business issues of 
responsibility, liability, accountability, privacy, data 
protection and compliance need to be addressed. Cloud 
users need to devote time and resources to evaluating 
cloud providers in terms of their ability to support 
compliance requirements whether internal and/or 
regulatory in nature, and develop models and systems to 
support this evaluation both during system design and 
operations. SAS 70 Type II [6] and ISO 27001 
information security standards [7], are emerging as ways 
to evaluate cloud provider security but they remain high 
level procedures and not linked to runtime tooling. Other 
standards such as Payment Card Industry and Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act do not 
directly address requirements for cloud providers [8] 
although some providers do now supply information on 
how to achieve HIPPA using their clouds [9]. Vendor 
responses to compliance have seen the likes of Verizon 
(CaaS), Unisys (Stealth) and Microsoft's Azure support 
secure practices (e.g. ISO27001) and/or products for the 
cloud, but these are only scratching the surface. The 
Cloud Security Alliance and the Jericho Forum are only 
focused on developing best practices and consensus [10] 
and no supporting tools exist today to support them.  
The technical issues associated with cloud trust and 
security include the technical requirements for 
implementing the consequences of trust decisions and 
trust relationships asserted at the business level. Typical 
mechanisms used in implantation include tight access 
controls, secure authentication, appropriate encryption of 
data, logging and playback, intrusion detection, anomaly 
detection, encrypted management mechanisms and more. 
Many technologies exist and to cover them all would go 
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead we focus on the 
essential need for policy dynamics across federations 
considering identity and access control, along with how to 
communicate requirements between different parties. 
For access control, the most widely used distributed 
security policy architecture and representation is probably 
XACML, an XML language for expressing security 
policies, access requests, decisions and an architecture for 
(intra-domain) distributed policy administration, decision-
making and enforcement [11]. XACML 2.0 provides 
profiles for RBAC and privacy as well as extensions for 
hierarchies (resources, roles), policy combining 
algorithms and integration for SAML assertions). 
However, the model for verifying and combining these 
policies assumes shared role/resource semantics, so it is 
difficult to communicate and use policies across domain 
boundaries or in a multi-stakeholder context. XACML 
V3.0 (still in development) adds administrative delegation 
and obligation notion to support decentralized policy 
administration but it does not offer a solution for the 
shared role/resource semantics issue, or allow 
dynamically changing rules for combining policies for 
evaluation. There are several research efforts to go 
beyond XACML and address cross-domain and 
especially dynamic security issues. PERMIS [12] is quite 
similar XACML supporting delegation and separation of 
duties, and multiple sources of authority (i.e. trusted 
sources of policies and user attributes), so it can be used 
in a cross-domain context but it doesn't support process 
dynamics as a core policy concept an essential element 
for compliance in dynamic service-based systems. 
Communicable policy representations are also an 
essential requirement. These have been addressed by 
service annotation models such as WS-Policy [13] which 
can be used to describe policies for using services (e.g. 
use of encrypted communications, or inclusion of 
particular SOAP headers or attribute tokens) and attached 
to service descriptions so they can be processed by client 
software when generating requests.  
We can see that the combination of business/system 
compliance and technical level capabilities are needed to 
support data, process and trust management in Clouds. 
No cloud provider addresses this capability in a coherent 
and consistent way. The following section describes our 
PaaS solution including the application of the CORAS 
methodology and how semantic risk models can be used 
to plan, analyze and monitor WS-Trust services and 
Process-Based Access Control (PBAC) policies [14], 
specifically focusing on state-based model of processes in 
which a service can be used, and the definition of roles 
with respect to this model as policy targets so they can be 
mapped to externally defined roles of partners through 
additional mapping' policy rules. 
 




The methodology adopted by the Platform is based on 
the CORAS risk management process [15] and adapted 
for use with dynamic service based systems. Risk 
management activities include initial security planning, 
security service provisioning, active threat identification 
and threat assessment.  
The high-level PaaS components for on-demand cloud 
security are shown in Figure 1. At the highest layer 
Operational Security of an Enterprise are responsible for 
planning the service network considering Business 
Requirements through an initial risk assessment. The task 
is completed using a Cloud security decision support tool 
(CS-DST) which provides the user interface for risk 
management throughout the lifecycle of the service-based 
applications. A model is produced of the known security domains, communication paths, threats and vulnerabilities 
along with mitigations including trust establishment 
processes, user roles and access rights. The model is 
represented using semantic specification language so it 
can be interpreted during other risk management phases. 
The next task is to deploy the mitigation measures as 
services and associated policies during the application 
provisioning to provide Service Governance. This action 
instructs the PaaS provider to provision and configure the 
SOI from a palette of tools and services from the cloud 
provider in accordance with the defined security model. 
In our SOI this includes security token services for 
identity (X509 or Active Directory) and access control 
(WS Trust STS), policy enforcement interceptors, policy 
decision services and intrusion monitoring tools. All tools 
are connected to the CS-DST to provide security event 
monitoring and mitigating management trigger actions 
through WS-Notification. In additional, business 
processes used to manipulate data assets are also the 
source for security events. These events are used for 
security analysis, threat identification, assessment and 
reaction within the CS-DST with the aim of providing a 






















of IPR risks, strategic 
and operational impacts
trust and policy 
management 










IaaS compute, storage, network
 
 
Figure 1. On-demand cloud security services 
 
3.1 Dynamic Security Services 
 
The PaaS solution includes a palette of security 
services that can be configured and adapt to changing 
security policies during runtime with minimal loss of 
functionality and with little or no manual assistance. The 
services take into account the ability to reconfigure 
security policy at any time to address events such as shifts 
in alliances, changes in personnel, changes in the 
execution environment (e.g. transition from trusted 
execution environment to untrusted execution 
environment), and crisis situations. The services support 
both dynamic identity federation and dynamic 
authorization policy for fine-grained control of services in 
the Cloud. The dynamic authorization system takes into 
consideration different events (e.g. intrusion) when 
deciding if a certain request should be granted or revoked. 
This allows exposing different service/component 
functions according to the context evaluation.  
This contextual information is available for the 
protected security-aware component to allow its extension 
with adaptive functionality that reacts positively to the 
environment events (e.g. modifying component behavior) 
rather than failing in some manner. Contextual policies, 
as opposed to static ones, offer a dynamic interpretation 
of authorization rights (i.e. in terms of authorized 
resource/component operations). The security policy 
requires that a certain function, that returns sensitive 
digital assets, be unavailable when an intrusion or attack 
is detected. Our approach is based on three observations: 
1.  The meaning of ‘security attributes’ in Clouds is 
actually not defined by the issuer, but by service 
provider(s) when they refer to the attributes in an access 
control policy. The issuer defines the process for deciding 
what attributes should be issued to each user, but how this 
is interpreted is entirely up to the service provider(s). 
2.  Since the service provider typically doesn’t know 
the rules for issuance, there has to be some way for the 
issuer to communicate with the service provider to ensure 
that the policy is consistent with this. 
3.  Once a service provider understands how to 
interpret an attribute in their own access policy, they can 
transfer this understanding to other providers, either 
directly or by issuing their own ‘derived’ attributes to the 
user and communicating their meaning in turn. 
Note that the process of making connections between 
attributes and policy (steps 2-3) is inherently dynamic. 
New attributes can be defined at any time, and policies 
can (in some cases must) be updated to handle them as 
soon as their existence is communicated to the service 
provider. These basic principles are further elaborated in 
[16]. Given this, it is possible to use WS-Trust and WS-
Federation design patterns to provide a service-oriented 
architecture for dynamic attribute federation. The key 
elements in the architecture are: the use of WS-Trust as a 
standard mechanism for obtaining and validating security 
tokens encoding identity or other attributes; the use of 
WS-Federation patterns to orchestrate these token 
exchanges when a service is accessed; the use of simple 
attributes in tokens that cross the boundary between 
domains; the use of simple messages to communicate the 
meaning of these tokens (through ‘policy mappings’) 
between token issuer and token validator. 
This last feature establishes (and gives meaning to) the 
relationship between the two security token services 
(STS), thus filling the gap in WS-Trust and WS-
Federation by explicitly addressing the question of how ‘trust’ is established in the first place. It provides a 
flexible way for attributes from one domain to be used in 
other domains, even if the original identity is local to its 
provider (e.g. based on Active Directory usernames). It 
allows extended value chains to be established by passing 
‘policy mapping’ messages up and down the chain as 
required. The use of ‘policy mappings’ to and from a 
simple, cross-domain security attribute token makes it 
possible to obscure the original identity and attributes as 
rights are established down the chain of service providers. 
It is also possible to define as many simplified attributes 
as one wants to represent arbitrary bundles of access 
rights as required by the user. Finally, it is still possible to 
audit service access, by tracing security tokens back up 
the chain through the accountable providers of policy 
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Figure 2. Dynamic policy architecture 
 
The implementation of this model is based on Policy-
Based Access Control (PBAC), a dynamic access control 
mechanism used in GRIA. PBAC provides a uniform 
approach to trust management and access control. PBAC 
facilitates simple orchestration and adaptive composition 
through the delegation and dissolution of trust 
relationships by changing access control policies. PBAC 
is based on the XACML architecture including a PEP 
(Policy Enforcement Point), a PDP (Policy Decision 
Point) and one or more a PIPs (Policy Information 
Points).  
Conceptually, a service controls a number of 
resources. Each resource is identified by a unique 
resource ID, which is a globally unique string (often a 
URI). Each resource has a workflow state and a resource 
type. Different operations on the resource are possible in 
different states. For example, it is not possible to perform 
the "read" operation on resources of "data stager" type 
which is in the "empty" state. Each possible operation of 
a given state has a set of workflow roles (or process role) 
which may invoke it. The definition of the workflow state 
model and workflow roles results in what is known as the 
static policy.  
To access an operational a subject requires a security 
attribute that is mapped to a workflow role. A subject can 
only invoke the operation if the intersection of these two 
sets is non-empty (i.e., if they have one of the permitted 
roles). The rules for determining a subject’s workflow 
roles can be changed dynamically, allowing users to 
delegate access to a resource to others. Delegation is 
performed by invoking a delegation service operation, 
and therefore delegation is also controlled by the policy. 
The dynamic policy consists of a set of policy rules. 
For a user to have a particular workflow role, they must 
match at least one Sufficient rule, all Necessary rules, and 
no Deny rules. There are five types of match rules: 
Subject DN is ...: This rule will only match someone 
with a distinguished name (DN) as given by a provided 
X.509 certificate, which is signed by a specified CA.  
Certificate is signed by …: This rule will match 
anyone whose identity is vouched for by a particular CA.  
Has SAML attribute …:. This rule will match anyone 
with a SAML assertion signed by a specified SAML 
issuer asserting that they have the specified (name, value) 
attribute. 
Member of group …: This rule will match anyone who 
is a member of the specified group. Each group is itself a 
resource, and has its own set of match rules to determine 
who is a member.  
Anyone: This rule matches for everyone 
The static policy is defined by a service provider when 
the service is deployed within the cloud and includes 
policy mappings from the provider’ perspective, for 
example, mapping a workflow role to a database login. 
The initial deployment also includes an STS that is used 
to validate a subjects security attributes against workflow 
roles even though the specific attributes or issuers have 
not be defined yet. It is then possible for service 
consumers, collaborators or resource owners to use high-
level system modeling tools to define security attributes 
and roots of trust for dynamic policies at runtime without 
the service provider needing redeploy the service or to 
know the semantics of security attribute in advance. This 
is described in the next section. 
 
3.2 Security Modelling and  Decision Support 
 
Modeling security requirements within the Cloud is 
planned and monitored using purpose built information 
security (InfoSec) tools [17]. Underpinning these is an 
ontology that is used to reason about security risks 
associated with underlying web service policies. The 
ontology supports the specification of administration 
domains, communication links and associated, threats, 
vulnerabilities and countermeasures associated with 
information exchanges. Figure 5 shows a graphical 
representation of a section of the InfoSec ontology and 



























Figure 3. key classes used in policy generation 
 
The InfoSec_Entity is the parent class of all entities in 
the ontology. It is a core entity of the security model and 
related to all other entities which are further described in 
[17]. A Domain is a specific type of InfoSec_Entity and it 
represents a group of people performing similar 
operations on a common set of data. A Capability is an 
abstract concept of a function that can be performed, e.g. 
"get data from repository" or "add new document to 
repository". Each Capability has one or more 
Capability_Arguments, which are abstract definitions of 
the types of data required to perform the function of the 
Capability. These arguments are kept abstract as each 
capability can be implemented in different ways with 
different services naming their parameters differently or 
adding additional parameters while still implementing the 
same Capability. A Capability_Service is a service (e.g. 
web service) that can deliver a capability. The 
Capability_Service supports concrete implementations of 
one or more implementations. Each Capability_Service 
can have multiple named Service_States. Each state 
supports a potentially complete subset of the capabilities 
that are supported by the Capability_Service. One 
Service_State can also be defined as the initial state for a 
Capability_Service. Service_States can also have a 
number of transitions and may allow for transitioning to 
the final “destroyed” state. State_Transition is a type of 
security event and is modeled as a simple pairing of two 
states, defining the states that the transition moves from 
and to when a given named event occurs. The modeling 
of states allows the consideration of process context in the 
security model. Each Capability_Service implements zero 
or more Capabilities and each Capability can be 
implemented by multiple Capability_Services, providing 
alternate implementation or sources for a given capability. 
The Capability_Service in our implementation has direct 
bindings to web service operations.  
Security_Attribute is a token that can be issued to a 
subject, for example this could be a workflow Role 
PBAC’s static policy or SAML attribute in the dynamic 
policy.. Each Domain can be a member of many 
Security_Attributes and each Security_Attribute can have 
many members. Security_Attribute_Membership is a 
mapping object that associates Domains as members of a 
SecurityAttributes is the first of two further mapping 
objects that allow accurate modeling of the mapping of 
attributes, capabilities, services and states. It specifies 
which attributes maps are applicable to a given Service. 
State_To_Capability_Mapping is a second mapping 
object. It maps Service_Security_Attributes to the 
capabilities that permission is granted to and the states in 
which the service must be for those permissions to be 




In this section we describe the Platform evaluation 
results based on a scenario of collaborative design of 
complex engineering products. The scenario includes two 
companies AerosCo (Prime Contractor) and StoresCo 
(Supplier) working together for a military customer. 
AeroCo designs aircraft and StoresCo designs missiles 
(stores) with each company operating independently 
lifecycle management for their products. The engineering 
challenge is for the Prime Contractor and Supplier to 
ensure safe compatibility between the aircraft and stores 
during launch using computation fluid dynamics (CFD) 
simulation techniques. The business challenge is for each 
company to protect intellectual property in their 
engineering designs and manage security threats in 3
rd 

































Figure 4. Integrated simulation data model 
 
The Prime Contractor (PC) supplies the Global model 
of the aircraft and a Pylon interface model used to attach 
the stores to the aircraft. The Global model needed to 
remain secret to the PC and the pylon was shared with the 
supplier. The stores model was provider by the Supplier and needed to remain secret to the Supplier. The 
simulation process (meshing, assembly, simulation and 
post processing) was orchestrated by the PC even though 
some data within the process could not be accessed by 
their engineers. The resultant behavior of the Aircraft and 
Stores needed to be kept confidential to each party. The 
aircraft behavior could only be accessed by the PC and 
the Stores behavior could only be access by the Supplier.  
The Platform was deployed at the CFMS virtual 
capability laboratory which provides a multi-tenant Cloud 
infrastructure supporting collaborative engineering 
design. The Cloud operator acts as a secure trusted 3rd-
party for the integrated simulation. The Cloud consists of 
computation and storage infrastructure hardware, 
platform services based on GRIA which is used for the 
dynamic provisioning of engineering applications, 
workflows and associated security services [18] and CS-
DST based on the InfoSec tools. The SaaS includes 
Share-A-Space product data management (PDM) system 
[19] and various CFD analysis codes wrapped as services 
for model assembly, simulation and post processing. All 
of the collaborative design processes where orchestrated 

















Figure 5. InfoSec tools cloud security domain 
model 
In the scenario, the PC performed an initial security 
risk assessment for collaboration by describing 
information security islands, domains and capabilities (e.g 
ability to produce data assets) along with mitigation 
measures such as security policies and intrusion 
monitoring tools). Islands included PrimeContractorNet, 
SupplierNet, CloudNet and RoW (see Figure 5). Each 
island had domains defined, for example, 
PrimeContractorNet has two domains AeroEngineer and 
AeroManager which mapped directly onto security 
attributes issued to subjects. For each interaction between 
domains and islands a connection was defined.  Each 
connection was assigned properties, for example “Web 
Service”, and a risk assessment performed to identify 
vulnerabilities, threats and mitigation measures for the 
information channel. For example, the Supplier needed to 
deliver the stores model to the PDM system hosted in the 
IntegratedSimulation domain of CloudNet. A connection 
was defined between the IntegratedSimulation domain 
and the StoresManager domain with the capability 
uploadCAD. Vulnerabilities where defined for the 
uploadCAD capability in terms of unauthorized access, 
integrity, and confidentiality. Security countermeasures 
were selected linking directly to GRIA’s policies and 
monitoring components. The resultant GRIA static policy 
defining the capabilities as service operations including 
uploadCAD is shown in Table 1. 
 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<state-model description="http://aeroco/Share-A-space"  
  xmlns="…./grid/pbac2/staticpolicy/types"> 
 <state name="UNINITIALISED-STATE"> 
   <transition><event  name="init"/><to-state 
name="default"/></transition> 
</state> 
 <state name="default"> 
  <operation name="logout"> 
   <process-role name="Reader"/> 
   <process-role name="Writer"/> 
   <process-role name="Owner"/> 
  </operation> 
  <operation name="attachAnalysis"> 
   <process-role name="Writer"/> 
   <process-role name="Owner"/> 
  </operation> 
  <operation name="createBillOfMaterials"> 
   <process-role name="Writer"/> 
   <process-role name="Owner"/> 
  </operation> 
  <operation name="downloadCAD"> 
   <process-role name="Reader"/> 
   <process-role name="Writer"/> 
   <process-role name="Owner"/> 
  </operation> 
  <operation name="uploadCAD"> 
   <process-role name="Writer"/> 
   <process-role name="Owner"/> 
  </operation> 
  <operation name="login"> 
   <process-role name="Reader"/> 
   <process-role name="Writer"/> 
   <process-role name="Owner"/> 
  </operation> 
  <transition><event  name="destroy"/><to-state 
name="DESTROYED-STATE"/></transition> 
 </state> 
 <state name="DESTROYED-STATE"/> </state-model> 
 Table 1. Generated PBAC policy 
 
PrimeContractorNet was the root of trust for GRIA 
WS-Trust security token services issuing AeroEngineer 
and AeroManager SAML assertions as a mitigation 
measure for unauthorized access and confidentiality. A 
similar approach was taken for StoresManager domain 
within SupplierNet.  The resultant roots of trust and 
SAML attributes were used to generate match patterns 
associated with GRIA’s dynamic policies. For example, 
the SAML attribute required by the Supplier to access the 








Table 2. Generated SAML attribute 
 
The business requirements asserted that continuous 
monitoring of vulnerabilities during the collaboration was 
required. The evaluation focused on monitoring security 
events associated with dynamic policies and data integrity 
vulnerabilities. Each monitor acted as a security event 
source to which the InfoSec tools subscribe using WS-
Notification [21]. Each security event triggers an impact 
analysis that can result in warnings to cloud users and 
recommendations for further investigation. For example, 
once uploaded CAD models needed to remain immutable 
to prove integrity of derived analysis results. Intrusion 
was identified as a threat for the data integrity 
vulnerability associated with the Stores model and an 
integrity monitoring tool was deployed alongside the 
PDM repository. During the evaluation an intrusion 
attack on the IntegratedSimulation domain was simulated 
resulting in corruption of the StoresModel. The attack 
triggered a security warning within the InfoSec tools, 
identifying integrity errors with the Stores model. An 
impact analysis report was generated using data 
relationships defined within the Bill of Materials of the 
PDM system to understand which data assets were 
affected by the corrupted model. The report was then 
used by the PC to determine if simulation results needed 
to be recalculated. 
 
5. Future Work 
 
All policy representations at some stage encode trust 
assumptions that cannot be checked by policy decision 
processes (however intelligent), but reflect the beliefs of a 
stakeholder about the other stakeholders in their system. 
In simple models, these trust assumptions may be limited 
to a set of trusted sources of identity or other assertions 
provided by users. Existing web service security 
standards allow these sources to lie beyond domain 
boundaries. In more complex cases, trust assumptions are 
not limited to who can make assertions about external 
actors, but may cover agreements about the behavior of 
components. These may be specified in (sometimes 
machine readable) Service Level Agreements, which 
form part of the wider frameworks used to describe, 
access, use and govern services (policies and contracts). 
Several languages have been developed to represent 
SLAs, and the most widely adopted so far is WS-
Agreement [19], though none of these languages have 
gained much traction in the distributed systems 
community. Although not standardised, the SLA 
specifications used in the GRIA middleware are 
especially interesting, as they are designed to act as ‘trust 
anchors’ for security as well as a basis for management in 
a cross-domain network of services.  
This idea is being further developed in FP7 SERSCIS 
where the key to the approach is to use semantic models 
and reasoning to analyze critical infrastructure 
requirements and vulnerabilities, including ICT failures 
and the cascading of failures through interconnected ICT 
systems. These models will then be used to describe, 
develop and operate service-oriented systems with a high 
level of security and dependability, capable of automatic 
adaptation to compensate for faults or changing 
requirements, or to prevent the spread of disruptive 
effects between interconnected ICT systems. Governance 
services are being developed to manage trust relationships 
via service level agreements that encode dependability 





This paper has shown how novel PaaS software can be 
used to model, analyze, plan and monitor system security 
requirements in cloud environments. The techniques 
applied incorporate security risk assessment tooling, 
dynamic service provisioning and dynamic web service 
security infrastructures. 
We have shown that to improve adoption of Clouds by 
industry, business requirements for securing assets in 
collaborative processes must be closely coupled to 
technical countermeasures in the platform. To be 
successful such integration must be facilitated through 
decision support tools and dynamic security services 
deployed on-demand and operated actively throughout 
the execution of distributed business processes. The 
Platform has been evaluated through a specific 
application scenario from collaborative engineering sector which has provided valuable business requirements 
associated with the protection of intellectual property. 
The capabilities of the Platform support security concerns 
throughout the full lifecycle of a service-oriented 
application deployed within the cloud, this includes: 
security requirements modeling for distributed cloud 
business processes; threat mitigation by linking security 
models to dynamic web service security policies and 
services; business-level vulnerably monitoring by 
processing operational security events and using them to 
trigger impact analysis within data assets. 
Overall the Platform demonstrated that for adoption of 
clouds by industry security cannot be considered just at 
design time but needs to form part of an overall operator 
strategy. Operational security experts from all 
stakeholders, including cloud providers and customers, 
need to be supported by collaborative decision making 
tools to assess cloud providers and address business level 
concerns at runtime. These requirements will be further 
addressed by linking trust decisions to service behaviors 
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